Is Britain Actually Poor?

Britain must use developing country standards to identify – and address what actual poverty is.

With the advent of programs such as Channel 4’s Benefits Street, talk of welfare cuts and major anti-poverty campaigns underway, one would think that the crux of such matters – what British poverty actually is – had been adequately resolved.

The British understanding of ‘poverty’ has led every party to adhere to what is arguably a morally bankrupt understanding of the term.

Each anti-poverty organisation in the UK campaigns on the basis that ‘low-income’ is interchangeable with ‘poverty’. After probing the work of anti-poverty politicians or media outlets, it appears that few seem to correctly articulate what poverty or deprivation really is.  Little wonder, then, that it is a huge political football that no party gets right.

The UK government defines ‘low-income’ as ‘poverty’ i.e. those individuals that receive less than 252 GBP BHC per week net disposable income, excluding housing costs: this in itself is extraordinary. Many agree –  with some anti-poverty campaigners seeking to go  further by stating that below 220 GBP/week AHC constitutes the ‘poverty line’ – and that it is not a merely low-income category. Whilst a tenuous case can be made for the consideration of such sums – which amount to 60% of the UK’s median income to be thought of as ‘poverty’, in practice, this is a nonsense both in relative and absolute terms. Not least that it sits apposite to discussions of social exclusion in a country that is highly developed. In short, only 3pc of households in the UK are materially deprived. That is less than the 7pc of households afflicted by drug use. The number of pensioners with low-incomes have declined to their lowest level in 30 years, as with children in low-income households in 25 years respectively.

Whilst some parties advocate that the ‘poverty line’ is fit for purpose, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation policy group, with allies including Oxfam, the Child Poverty Action Group and others, still rely upon the same circular datasets and campaigns to make its headlines.Some do argue, properly, for measures of social exclusion to be included into what is an already tenuous British ‘poverty’ definition – an international practice, but despite that, all have failed to seriously adopt a credible line a way that would satisfy a realistic, contextual and relevant definition of poverty.

The country is arguing over a definition that is inaccurate, doesn’t correspond to international standards and isn’t representative of the actual cost of living. That is also why many households classified as in ‘poverty’ or ‘low-income’ actually – in the now-forgotten words of a lone Joseph Rowntree researcher  – ‘experience high standards of living’.

UNFIT BY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

What compounds this highly problematic issue is that the basket of goods relied upon to weigh the poverty index does not correspond to international standards. The only index that does, the Office of National Statistics’s recent RPIJ, has not been adopted – where over a 16 year period the current index is 7 per cent higher than it actually should be. More evidence that British poverty is not at all what it appears to be.

COST OF POVERTY FOR BRITISH LEFT OR RIGHT?

This isn’t a concern directed at one group or political party. The cost to the poor is not, for instance, understood by the Labour Left. By overstating or inaccurately identifying the number of deprived living in Britain, an extraordinary opportunity cost exists where fewer funds are allocated to those in actual need –for instance those with disabilities or vulnerable pensioners.

It also adversely affects public opinion that could be properly, permanently convinced of the need for benefits for those in genuine need. For those on the putative Tory right, an accurate depiction of deprivation and social exclusion would force greater scrutiny and accountability in contentious political areas such as benefit cuts, where spurious claims as to acute or genuine need would cease. Contentious claims as to where benefits are spent – ie the preservation of non-means tested fuel payments to pensionable millionaires would probably be scrapped. For every penny spent on those not in need, the gap between those genuinely deprived is less likely to be breached. Britain does have the equivalent of its bottom billion – those who can be better helped if they are correctly targeted.

A serious debate must be held to what constitutes social exclusion and poverty in the UK – before any decides whether or not certain groups are correct to receive whichever benefits they do. Consensus cannot be reached if the ‘poverty line’ itself in the context of the UK is redundant. The UK is wholly divorced from the international discourses on poverty. And this in turn has clear implications in generating an anti-competitive culture. Developed nations have lost sight of what deprivation is and that has manifold political and economic consequences. 

The Emirati Right to Associate

The UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Anwar Gargash has today released a troubling oped in The National.

In the article, Dr Gargash (who also has oversight of the nation’s nascent electoral system) asserts that “The UAE’s end goal is not a liberal multiparty system. This model does not correspond with our culture or historical development”. Yet not forgetting that the UAE’s constitution requires that the nation moves to a full parliamentary democracy, Dr Gargash speaks to three very troubling ideas:

1. Dr  Gargash has often suggested that the region suffers from a lack of democratic culture which is the precursor to elections. Perhaps Dr Gargash thinks of the failed political fortunes of Kuwait, which he has often compared to the UAE. But this example is not relevant. The UAE’s emergent record against corruption should have countered vote-buying on the basis of tribalism or sectarianism moreso than other states. Kuwait’s faults begin and end with its lack of democracy – transparency, accountability, the rule of law – not with its freedom to associate.

2. Further, Dr Gargash states “There is insufficient evidence that a multiparty system works in the Arab world.” In brief, Dr Gargash challenges the universal human right to the freedom of association.  But such universal freedoms should not be tossed aside so lightly. They are not culturally specific, nor should they be. These freedoms were conceived as universally relevant, not least to Emiratis.

Rejecting Fukuyama’s End of History thesis (that Western liberal democracy is the end point of our evolution) should not entail the rejection of a governance model that upholds the freedom to peacefully associate, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the basis of which preceded the independence of the UAE by over twenty years.

3. Further, Dr Gargash states that “We have a natural aversion to political parties because in the Arab world these parties have disintegrated into tribes, clans and sectarian groups. Recent developments in the Arab world augment this view, and political parties remain polarised, threatening the unity of the state and the cohesiveness of the society.”

Infact, prior to the Dubai Crisis, the UAE was upheld by its peers as the region’s beacon of human development. Underscoring this was a message from Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid – that there was no such thing as Arab exceptionalism – that Arabs were not exceptionally destined to be impoverished, poorly educated, subject to cruel and harsh punishments and to live out lesser lives than fellow men and women. He sought to convince the world that Arab culture was not uniquely destined to fail, despite what legions of orientalists may have said. He challenged the continually perpetuated idea of the Arab as a lesser human – and lesser able to grapple with the rights accorded to him.

It is all the more disappointing then, that Dr Gargash appears to give credence to an antiquated  view of Arabs as ill-equipped for the freedom of thought, to associate, to be free from arbitrary arrest, exile or its corollaries.

Dr Gargash could have explained the lack of freedom in the Arab world through evidence-based economics and history- the resource curse, colonialist exploits and more. All of which can be overcome and managed properly. Clans and tribes are not unique to the world. Indeed, many societies overcome such social constructs and have lived to tell the tale. Instead, Dr Gargash, and the UAE itself, may be limiting the aspirations of its own people, to avert a crisis which ought never to have arisen.

Gulf forces should steer clear of Syria

Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy among others have now proposed that an Arab or Muslim force must intervene in Syria. That idea might sound laudable. But as I’ve noted before, Arab armies have little or no experience in playing a leading role in complex democratic transitions. Would that they did – but a sober dose of realism is needed.

Why is this pertinent now? Several authors are using NATO’s intervention into Kosovo as a precedent for Arab or Gulf military intervention into Syria. But few are thinking of preparations for the aftermath. For a start, KFOR was led by forces sent from democratic nations. Although a worthy endeavour, the UAE sent 1500 of its troops to join KFOR – but these weren’t acting in a strategic, leadership capacity. The very limited UAE hearts-and-minds force in Afghanistan has often met with tragic consequences.

GCC forces are not accountable to any democratic body. Nor would any force be that hails from the Arab League. Bahrain is a great example of why that matters. Although Bahrain’s chaos is in no way analogous to Syria, it is a good case-study as to why an Arab, and specifically GCC, intervention should not be inserted throughout an intense, bloody, civil war. The GCC Peninsula Shield in Bahrain demonstrated that although it may have been defending critical “infrastructure” when the uprising began, its presence there was shrouded in utter secrecy. No press briefings were given by Shield officials outlining detailed plans, no communal outreach was undertaken by the Shield, no tangible needs assessments or reconstruction assistance were offered – and this further contributed to the decline of relationships within Bahrain.

A peacekeeping mission similar to KFOR but comprised of Arab League or GCC states is an exercise in wishful thinking. GCC forces are not equipped to provide peacekeeping. Command and control structures do not voluntarily respond to indepth inquiry. Nor can a force be cobbled together at short enough notice or trained to do so within a meaningful time-frame. In addition, the monitoring and reporting structures required to “democratize” access to GCC military forces would need to be created – this is a fairly impossible task for forces that have never had to demonstrate major institutional accountability, not least as such portfolios are directly controlled by de facto ruling parties within the Gulf itself . This is not a matter of building a skyscraper; human lives are at stake – good governance and solid accountability in times of warfare is critical.  The “Gulf’s militaries are a red line” to quote one official – and that “red line” denotes incapacity; both to the detriment of Syria as well as the Gulf. Any transitional agreement or intervention must be buttressed by a peacekeeping force that is able, transparent and equipped to deal with intense scrutiny – inshort, an accountable force. This is why I continue to assert that Turkey is the only regional neighbour able to fulfill such a role. Dr. Can Kasapoğl of the Strategic Research Institute at the Turkish War College believes this to be a possibility now:

“Turkey has reportedly sought two major parameters for the legitimacy of a possible military operation: the full failure of the AL initiative and a UNSC decision. At this point, two critical questions should be raised: first, whether Moscow and China can be “convinced” at least to abstain in another UNSC vote, and second, if the bloody crackdown continues to intensify in Syria, whether Turkey can play a role in a non-UNSC approved military mission?”

Twelve years on and KFOR is still present in Kosovo. A protracted peacekeeping presence in Syria had better be doing the right thing.